新型インフルエンザ等対策政府行動計画

Objectives

Japan’s Government Action Plan establishes a whole-of-society framework for preparing for and responding to novel influenza, COVID-19, other respiratory infections and serious emerging infectious diseases that may spread rapidly nationwide. Its overarching purpose is to protect life and health, suppress transmission as far as possible, and minimise disruption to daily life, public welfare and the national economy while respecting fundamental human rights.[1][2][3]

• Build resilient, flexible preparedness in normal times because infectious disease crises cannot be predicted or fully prevented.[4][5]
• Balance infection-control interventions with social and economic activity, applying restrictions only where legally grounded and no more than necessary.[2][6][7]
• Implement an integrated set of 13 action areas: implementation arrangements; intelligence and analysis; surveillance; information provision and risk communication; border measures; prevention of spread; vaccines; medical care; therapeutics; testing; public health; supplies; and stability of citizens’ lives and the national economy.[3][8]
• Prepare for prolonged crises, multiple waves, pathogen mutation and a range of respiratory threats rather than relying on a single disease scenario or past experience.[9][10][11]
• Advance cross-cutting workforce development, national-local collaboration, digital transformation, research and development, international cooperation and a One Health approach linking human, animal and environmental health.[12][13][14]
• Strengthen scientific readiness through the Japan Institute for Health Security, known as JIHS, including intelligence, surveillance, risk assessment, clinical and epidemiological investigation, research networks, technical guidance and public communication.[15][16][17]
• Secure rapid development, production, procurement, distribution and administration of vaccines, diagnostic products and treatments, alongside sufficient healthcare, testing, public-health and supply capacity.[18][19][20]
• Protect vulnerable groups, prevent stigma and discrimination, and ensure that public information and services are accessible to children, older people, foreign residents and people with disabilities.[21][22][23]

The plan uses a phased and adaptive strategy: preparedness, initial response and response. Early action prioritises detection, risk assessment and, where justified, containment to delay transmission and gain time to expand healthcare capacity and develop countermeasures; later action adjusts or scales down measures as evidence, population immunity, vaccines, treatments and system capacity improve.[24][25][26]

Implementation

Implementation combines central strategic direction with locally led delivery. The national government sets basic policy and coordinates cross-ministerial action, while prefectures lead regional containment and healthcare provision, municipalities support vaccination and residents’ daily lives, and healthcare institutions, businesses, designated public institutions and the public undertake defined preparedness and response roles.[27][28][29]

• Operate crisis management through the Cabinet Secretariat’s infectious disease coordinating agency, Government Response Headquarters when statutory conditions are met, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and JIHS as the central scientific and operational resource.[30][31][32]
• Use JIHS to integrate domestic and international intelligence, pathogen analysis, surveillance, scientific advice, First Few Hundred Studies, clinical research, workforce development and international cooperation.[16][33][17]
• Require prefectures to maintain prevention and medical plans, establish coordination councils, conclude medical action agreements, monitor capacity and coordinate beds, fever outpatient services, home care, accommodation-based care, patient transfers and staff deployment.[28][34][35]
• Develop public health centre and local health research institute capacity through emergency staffing plans, annual training, exercises, testing arrangements, active epidemiological investigation, health monitoring, digital tools, outsourcing and mutual aid.[36][37][38]
• Maintain layered surveillance of cases, hospitalisations, pathogen characteristics, genomic information, wastewater and animal reservoirs, and switch to emergency surveillance when risk assessment warrants it.[39][40][41]
• Use interoperable digital systems for outbreak notifications, electronic medical records, vaccination administration, healthcare capacity, supply monitoring and privacy-protected research data.[42][43][44]
• Apply proportionate border, testing, isolation, contact-management and spread-prevention measures according to pathogen severity, transmissibility, drug susceptibility, healthcare pressure, effectiveness, feasibility, human rights and socio-economic effects.[45][6][46]
• Maintain preparedness stockpiles and supply systems for personal protective equipment, medicines, vaccines, testing materials and essential goods; monitor supply and demand; and request production, imports, distribution or emergency transport where shortages arise.[47][48][49]
• Use accessible, two-way risk communication, call centres, consolidated websites, public feedback and misinformation monitoring to support informed action, trust and social cohesion.[50][51][52]
• Maintain continuity of essential services, business operations, welfare support, education, transport, communications, food supply and financial assistance while mitigating hardship among vulnerable households and affected businesses.[53][54][55]

Governance is supported by practical exercises, annual follow-up, evidence-based policy-making, information sharing, regular plan revision and a review of the Government Action Plan approximately every six years, with additional review after an actual emergency response.[56][57][58]Prefectures and municipalities with public health centres report prevention-plan progress annually, and healthcare capacity is monitored through the Medical Institutions Information Support System, known as G-MIS.[28][59][35]

Financing is principally described as national fiscal support, potential local government bond issuance, emergency budget provision and financial support for local authorities and affected institutions; however, the plan does not specify consolidated budget amounts, allocations, funding gaps or costed implementation targets.[56][60][61]

Monitoring & Evaluation

The plan establishes a multi-level monitoring, surveillance and learning system centred on continuous infectious disease intelligence, risk assessment and evidence-based policy-making. Information on pathogen characteristics, transmission, clinical presentation, healthcare capacity, public life and socio-economic effects is to inform decisions and the flexible escalation, easing or discontinuation of measures.[62][63][46]

• Operate routine and emergency surveillance using patient notifications, hospitalisation data, pathogen and genomic analysis, wastewater monitoring, animal-health information and health monitoring to detect outbreaks early and assess changing risks.[39][64][65][66]
• Use JIHS, local health research institutes, public health centres, healthcare institutions, quarantine stations and international networks to collect, analyse, interpret and rapidly share scientific and operational information.[67][68][69]
• Monitor healthcare readiness and pressure through the Medical Institution Information Support System, including secured and operational beds, bed occupancy, critical-care occupancy, outpatient pressure and infection-control supply stocks.[70][71][72]
• Track testing capacity through annual or regular reports by prefectures and other local authorities, verify laboratory readiness through exercises, and monitor testing activity, positivity rates and test quality.[73][74][75][76]
• Review vaccine effectiveness and safety, collect vaccination records and suspected adverse-reaction reports, conduct antibody and immunity surveys, and publish administered-dose information.[44][77][78]
• Monitor treatment effectiveness, adverse effects, antiviral resistance, medicine stockpiles, production capacity, distribution and regional availability to support appropriate allocation and clinical guidance.[79][80][81][82]
• Assess public awareness, trust, misinformation, public reactions and information needs, using social media, surveys and call-centre feedback to strengthen two-way risk communication.[50][83][51]
• Conduct practical exercises, including joint national-local exercises, and use findings to test arrangements, identify gaps and improve preparedness.[84][57][68]
• Undertake annual follow-up on implementation, make progress visible, review the Government Action Plan approximately every six years, and conduct additional review following an actual emergency response.[58]
• Require annual progress reporting by prefectures and municipalities with public health centres, supported by coordination councils and a Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle.[28][59]
• Maintain statutory accountability through reporting to the National Diet on the establishment, abolition and, where applicable, emergency declarations of Government Response Headquarters, alongside international notification to the World Health Organization under the International Health Regulations.[85][86][87]

While the plan specifies numerous operational measures, targets and reporting channels, it generally does not provide a consolidated national set of quantitative performance indicators, common evaluation methodology, reporting templates or independent evaluation arrangements.[57][68][66]

Costing & Financing

Financing provisions focus on securing resources rapidly for preparedness and emergency response, but the plan provides no quantified overall budget, programme allocations, funding-gap estimate, costing methodology or economic assumptions.[31][88][89]

• Provide necessary national fiscal measures for infectious disease countermeasures and enable local authorities to use national support and, where necessary, issue local government bonds for response expenditure.[56][60][61]
• Secure budgets promptly once an outbreak or potential outbreak is identified, and consider financial support for prefectures and municipalities to implement flexible measures.[60]
• Support contracted medical institutions that secure beds or provide fever outpatient services through temporary compensation maintaining pre-outbreak income until enhanced reimbursement or subsidies are available.[71][90][72]
• Provide financial and other support to businesses subject to requests for increased production, import, sale or lending of infection-control supplies.[49][91]
• Use push and pull research and development support, strategic research funding, public-health procurement and stockpiling to improve market predictability for vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics.[92][93][94]
• Support vaccine and treatment development, clinical trials, domestic manufacturing, dual-use facilities, diagnostic technologies, testing capacity, workforce development, digital systems, stockpiles and supply chains without specifying monetary values.[95][44][96][97]
• Provide necessary fiscal and other measures for businesses affected by infectious disease or containment measures, with consideration of fairness and effectiveness.[98][89]
• Use special lending, refinancing, repayment and grace-period extensions, possible interest-rate reductions, and crisis-response facilitation to support affected businesses and primary producers.[99][100]

The plan recognises that response measures should consider effects on daily life and socio-economic activity, including public-life disruption and economic impacts, but it does not assign monetary estimates to these effects.[45][7][54]