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National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan
Pandemic Preparedness and ResponseNational Control Plan2005
CroatiaEnglishPDF
National
AI-Generated Document Summary
Objectives
Croatia’s National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan establishes a whole-of-government framework for preventing, detecting, managing and reviewing influenza pandemics across World Health Organization stages, from the interpandemic period through emergence, pandemic waves and post-pandemic recovery. It seeks to reduce illness, deaths, disruption to essential services and economic harm through early warning, vaccination, antiviral measures, clinical care, laboratory capacity, public communication and control of animal influenza.
Establish national preparedness governance, an emergency command structure, sectoral action protocols and county-level implementation arrangements.
Strengthen epidemiological, virological, serological and animal-health surveillance to identify potentially pandemic strains, monitor circulation and assess population susceptibility.
Secure vaccines, antivirals, antibiotics, personal protective devices, laboratory supplies and logistics, while planning hospital, workforce and funeral-service surge capacity.
Prioritise limited pandemic vaccine and antiviral supplies for people at high risk of complications, essential health workers and services necessary for vital state functions.
Maintain at least 250,000 therapeutic antiviral doses and estimate a minimum first-wave requirement of 2,000,000 pandemic-vaccine doses, assuming two doses per person.
Support seasonal and non-pandemic influenza vaccination, including vaccination of older people and those with chronic conditions, while providing pneumococcal vaccination to designated risk groups in a pandemic.
Prepare public and professional communication, build medical and scientific consensus, and distribute the preparedness plan to institutions and authorities responsible for delivery.
Prevent and control avian influenza through notification, veterinary surveillance, official laboratory diagnosis, farm biosecurity, import restrictions and proportionate outbreak-control measures.
Review morbidity, mortality, virus circulation, vaccine and antiviral needs after pandemic waves, then revise the National Plan using national experience and World Health Organization guidance.
Implementation
Implementation combines central coordination by health authorities with delivery through public-health institutes, laboratories, primary care, hospitals, county structures, ministries, veterinary services and international reporting networks. Activities intensify as risk rises, retaining measures from earlier stages while adapting operations to epidemiological evidence, virus characteristics, availability of vaccines and medicines, and experience from preceding waves.
Coordinate national action through the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Health Crisis Headquarters and its Preventive Medical Care Department, supported by the National Committee on Intrapandemic Planning.
Assign sectoral ministries responsibility for their respective preparedness actions and activate County Health Headquarters, including public-health, hospital, county-government, veterinary and sanitary representatives, to implement recommendations locally.
Use the Croatian National Institute of Public Health for expert advice, national epidemiology, vaccination organisation, seroepidemiological investigation, virological identification, antiviral-sensitivity testing, outcome analysis and reporting to the World Health Organization.
Operate statutory notification and reporting networks linking diagnosing physicians, county and Zagreb public-health institutes, the national epidemiology service and the National Laboratory for Influenza.
Collect early respiratory and paired blood specimens from suspected cases, use temperature-controlled rapid transport, and maintain or expand laboratory capacity, including high-level biosafety arrangements for highly pathogenic strains.
Apply individual influenza-syndrome notifications outside the influenza season, transition to weekly aggregate reporting during seasonal or widespread transmission, and require laboratory reporting of positive findings and identified viral agents.
Increase sampling, surveillance, laboratory availability and reporting frequency as pandemic risk escalates, including 24-hour emergency diagnostic capacity and daily reporting during relevant stages.
Procure and reserve vaccines, antivirals, reagents, transport media and laboratory equipment; secure supplementary laboratory staff where needed; and have the health ministry provide funds to implement crisis-headquarters guidance within the health system.
Distribute antivirals through national and county public-health arrangements and primary-care physicians, retain medicines centrally for isolated cases, and decentralise supply when the pandemic strain becomes widespread.
Use post-exposure oseltamivir prophylaxis for close contacts early in an epidemic, plan protection for approximately 1,000 exposed people, and provide time-limited pre-exposure prophylaxis for essential operative-service staff.
Organise clinical screening, separate assessment areas where feasible, home management, observation, investigation or hospitalisation according to symptoms, stability, co-morbidity and complications.
Communicate centrally through designated health authorities, while local epidemiology services provide advice within their remit; publish adopted recommendations through the media and maintain information exchange with international institutions.
Coordinate animal-health measures through the Veterinary Administration, Veterinary Office, veterinary organisations and the Croatian Veterinary Institute’s Poultry Centre, with urgent notification, laboratory confirmation, movement restrictions, area designation and, where necessary, euthanasia or destruction of infected materials.
Monitor implementation through reporting lines, activity notifications, laboratory surveillance, vaccination surveillance and review of assigned-task completion; the supplied material does not specify a consolidated quantitative indicator set, audit system or formal evaluation timetable.
Monitoring & Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation centre on staged epidemiological, virological, laboratory and veterinary surveillance, supported by reporting through national, county and international structures. The framework links detection of human and animal influenza, assessment of pandemic risk, outbreak management and post-pandemic revision of preparedness arrangements.
Monitor domestic and international influenza trends during the interpandemic period, collaborate with national collaborative centres, notify the World Health Organization, and evaluate influenza vaccination campaigns.
Collect serological and microbiological samples when clinical notifications or clusters of influenza-like illness arise, involving national and county public-health institutes, clinical services, paediatricians and family doctors, and report promptly to the Ministry of Health Crisis Headquarters.
Report laboratory-confirmed cases comprehensively each week by age group, local hygiene-epidemiology unit and epidemiological week when individual-case processing is no longer practicable.
Use individual notification cards outside the influenza season and weekly aggregate reporting during the season, classified by illness week, outcome and four age groups.
Require laboratories to submit weekly aggregate reports of positive findings and identified viral agents from 1 September until the end of the following epidemic, with positive samples confirmed by the Croatian National Institute of Public Health National Influenza Laboratory.
Undertake daily, weekly and monthly monitoring and reporting once an epidemic or pandemic has begun, using notifications, cluster reports, aggregate health-system reports, laboratory findings and epidemiological investigations.
Intensify surveillance as pandemic risk rises through increased sampling, possible changes in reporting, serological and epidemiological surveys of population susceptibility, testing of antiviral sensitivity, and monitoring by location, age and risk group.
Maintain stage-specific laboratory reporting: weekly reporting to the national epidemiology service and World Health Organization reference centres during stages 1 and 2, daily reporting during stages 3 and 4, and continued surveillance with urgent information-sharing and null reporting during stage 5.
Monitor influenza circulation in poultry and pigs domestically and abroad, require notification of suspected or confirmed avian influenza, and use the Croatian Veterinary Institute’s Poultry Centre for official diagnostic investigation.
Require urgent veterinary reporting of suspected or confirmed avian influenza, allow initial oral notification followed by written reporting, and cancel notifications after prescribed disease-control, disinfection and incubation or serological conditions are met.
Analyse morbidity, mortality, virus circulation, vaccination and antiviral requirements after the first pandemic wave, report to the World Health Organization, and use experience to revise the National Plan for future pandemics.
Accountability is principally assigned through named reporting lines and institutional responsibilities, including the Ministry of Health Crisis Headquarters, Croatian National Institute of Public Health, county health headquarters, laboratories, physicians, veterinary authorities and sectoral ministries.The supplied material does not specify a consolidated quantitative indicator framework, formal audit process, performance targets, evaluation timetable or accountability sanctions.
Costing & Financing
Financing provisions are largely framed as resource requirements and institutional responsibilities rather than a quantified financial plan. The plan identifies vaccines, antivirals, antibiotics, diagnostics, laboratory capacity, logistics, hospital preparedness, personal protective equipment and public-health workforce capacity as areas requiring resources.
Secure annual vaccine supplies through the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, maintain antiviral and antibiotic stocks, and coordinate broader pandemic preparations through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.
Provide funds for implementation of Ministry of Health Crisis Headquarters guidelines within the health system, including measures associated with vaccine procurement, laboratory capacity and expanded hospital resources.
Fund supplemental laboratory equipment, potential additional skilled laboratory staff, high-level biosafety adaptations and sample transport media.
Plan resources for vaccine reservation and procurement, antiviral stocks, diagnostic reagents, laboratory equipment, transport media, continuous laboratory availability and additional staffing where required.
Prepare increased inpatient admissions, hospital beds and equipment, funeral-home capacity, rapid diagnostic-sample transport and additional home-visiting nursing capacity at county level.
Maintain at least 250,000 therapeutic antiviral doses in stock and estimate a minimum first-wave requirement of 2,000,000 pandemic vaccine doses, based on an assumption of two doses per person.
Plan post-exposure antiviral protection for an estimated 1,000 people and pre-exposure prophylaxis for 14,400 essential-service staff, requiring 61,000 boxes containing ten capsules.
Recognise a possible domestic oseltamivir powder presentation, for which one kilogram could provide therapy for 1,000 people, while noting that effective pandemic use would require established capsulation and handling arrangements.
Provide free-of-charge influenza sample testing through the “Influenza Control” project.
Approve purchase of 560,000 doses of vaccines against interpandemic influenza strains in 2005.
Identify uncosted requirements for training, workspace expansion, human resources, mobile-phone readiness, 24-hour virological teams, veterinary surveillance, import controls and farm biosecurity.
No total budget, unit costs, monetary allocations, funding sources, funding gaps, compensation arrangements, resource-mobilisation target or economic assumptions are specified in the supplied material.